Spoofing Detection for Global Navigation Satellite System Signals
- Detailed Technology Description
- This invention enables civilian GlobalNavigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers to determine whether the received signals are genuine or whether theyare deceptive signals that have been broadcast by a malicious spoofer.
- Others
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- M.L. Psiaki; S.P. Powell; B.W. O'Hanlon, "GNSS Spoofing Detection using High-Frequency Antenna Motion and Carrier-Phase Data," Institute of Navigation, PNT 2013
- M.L. Psiaki; S.P. Powell; B.W. O'Hanlon, "Innovation: GNSS Spoofing Detection: Correlating Carrier Phase with Rapid Antenna Motion," GPS World, Innovation Insights by Richard Langley
- *Abstract
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This invention enables civilian GlobalNavigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers, such as GPS receivers or receivers for the new European Galileo system and the new Chinese COMPASSsystem, to determine whether the received signals are genuine or whether theyare deceptive signals that have been broadcast by a malicious spoofer.
Spoofing attacks are detected by using short segments of carrier phase measurementsthat are collected while the receiver's antenna is undergoing a known,high-frequency motion profile. Thespoofing detection calculations correlate high-pass-filtered versions of theknown antenna motion with the carrier phasevariations. True signals produce aspecific correlation pattern, and spoofed signals produce a recognizablydifferent correlation pattern. These differing correlation characteristicsare used to determine if a spoofing attack is occurring.
The new GNSS spoofing detection technique has been tested with Monte Carlo simulations as well as with live data. It promises to be useful in homeland security applications to protect civilians and military assets from the dangers presented by false navigation signals.
Potential Applications:
Counter-measures for false GPS signals. e.g. to protect against misdirection or hijacking of fleets, airplanes, vehicles, power grid, power stations, stock-trading systems, etc.
Advantages:
- Detects live-signal spoofing attacks
- Requires modest antenna articulation
- May readily retrofit to existing GPS receivers
- Works for both encrypted military signals and unencrypted civilian signals
- Does not require changes to signal structure of unencrypted civilian GNSS signals
- *Licensing
- Martin Teschlmt439@cornell.edu(607) 254-4454
- Country/Region
- USA
