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Method And System For Conducting Combinatorial Auctions

Detailed Technology Description

None

Supplementary Information

Patent Number: US7627510B2
Application Number: US2006389558A
Inventor: Jain, Rahul | Kaskiris, Charis | Varaiya, Pravin | Shu, Jun | Rajagopal, Ram | Pillai, Nisha Sivasankara
Priority Date: 23 Mar 2005
Priority Number: US7627510B2
Application Date: 23 Mar 2006
Publication Date: 1 Dec 2009
IPC Current: G06Q004000
US Class: 705035 | 7050263 | 705036R | 705026
Assignee Applicant: The Regents of the University of California
Title: System and method for conducting combinatorial exchanges
Usefulness: System and method for conducting combinatorial exchanges
Summary: Used for transferring a good and service, trading financial instrument, network bandwidth and pollution-credit, and allocating electric power and aircraft-parking for air carrier.
Novelty: Double-sided exchange for trading e.g. financial instrument, has buyer interface for receiving buy bids from buyers, where controller matches sell bids with buy bids, and gives matched buy bids and sell bids

Industry

ICT/Telecom

Sub Category

Software/Application

Application No.

7627510

Others

Tech ID/UC Case

17399/2004-092-0

Related Cases

2004-092-0

*Abstract

Advancements in game theory and auction analysis have led to the development of various mechanisms to facilitate exchanging goods, services, and other things of value. For example, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions have beenproposed for various exchange-type applications.

Unfortunately, implementations of VCG auctions are often undesirably computationally complex and may require periodic infusions of capital for sustained operability. Such auctions are considered not budget balanced if additional infusions of capital are required.

Furthermore, certain applications may require that certain desirable auction properties, such as efficiency, be compromised. An efficient auction may be an auction that maximizes the aggregate benefit to participants, i.e., the social welfare,when participants act to benefit themselves, i.e., they bid selfishly.

In addition, conventional auction systems and methods often lack capabilities required for various real-world applications, especially applications involving exchange of combinations of items or things, such as portions of sub-links comprising a communication link.
To solve this problem, researchers at UC Berkeley have developed a double-sided exchange wherein both buyers and sellers provide bids for matching via the exchange. A first interface receives buy bids from buyers and a second interface receives sell bids from sellers. A controller matches the sell bids with the buy bids, yielding matched buy bids and matched sell bids in response thereto so that allocations of the matched buy bids and the matched sell bids maximize a surplus of the exchange. An allocation that substantially maximizes an auctioneer's profit and/or announces payments based on sell bids is provided. The announced allocations and prices can be shown to be a substantially competitive equilibrium in some applications. 

 

*IP Issue Date

Dec 1, 2009

*Principal Investigator

Name: Rahul Jain

Department:

Name: Charis Kaskiris

Department:

Name: Nisha Pillai

Department:

Name: Ram Rajagopal

Department:

Name: Jun Shu

Department:

Name: Pravin Varaiya

Department:

Country/Region

USA